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Abstract
We study the existence of countervailing buyer power in a vertical industry where
the input price is set via Nash bargainings between one upstream supplier and
many dierentiated but competing retailers. In case one bilateral bargaining
fails, the supplier still has the ability to sell to the other retailers. We show that
the capacity of these other retailers to react in the nal market has a dramatic
impact on the supplier's outside options and, ultimately, on input prices and
welfare. Under downstream quantity competition, we nd either no or opposite
support to the hypothesis of countervailing power on input prices, as the retail
industry becomes more concentrated. With price competition, we nd a case
for countervailing power, but its existence depends on the degree of product
dierentiation and on the ability of competing retailers to react to a disagreement.
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1 Introduction
The question of how input prices (including wages) are set is quite a subtle one,
both in Industrial Organization and in Labor Economics. While in most retail mar-
kets consumers are atomistic and, thus, are reasonably modelled as price takers when
patronizing a particular seller, it is less clear who has the ability to set the input
price in vertically-related markets. In particular, in \tight" oligopolies with a few up-
stream rms and a few downstream rms, a framework of bilateral negotiations, with
individually-negotiated input prices, seems to be quite appropriate.1
For example, food manufacturing has traditionally been highly concentrated, and
today concentration is high also in retailing, and in the rise (Dobson and Waterson,
2007). With high concentration on both sides, the relationship between concentration,
market power, and eciency is complex. It has been disputed, since the inuential 1952
book of J.K. Galbraith American Capitalism: The Concept of Countervailing Power,
that consolidation in the downstream (retailing) sector may actually be benecial to
consumers as fewer, more powerful, buyers, could negotiate cheaper input prices with
upstream suppliers, and nal consumers could benet to the extent that input price
reductions were also passed through on to them.
In the presence of high concentration downstream, upstream rms may also re-
spond by merging in order to increase their bargaining position. Horn and Wolinsky
(1988, henceforth HW) develop a model of a downstream duopoly in which rms
acquire inputs through bilateral monopoly relations with suppliers. They explicitly
account for the fact that the terms on which inputs are sold are determined in bar-
gaining between each rm and its supplier, using a Nash axiomatic approach to model
the bargaining. They nd that an upstream merger to monopoly is more protable
when downstream products are substitutes. Besides IO applications, the use of a
Nash axiomatic approach has also been widely used in Labor Economics to study the
wage determination between oligopolistic rms and unions (see, e.g., Davidson, 1988;
1Bilateral relations are typically explained by investments in specialized assets made by both
parties that lock them into the relationship. Alternatively, a \market interface" model should be ap-
plicable when there are many upstream rms and input purchases are made at list prices. See Inderst
(forthcoming) for a contrast between these two alternative ways of modeling vertical contracting.
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Dowrick, 1989). There, an industry-wide union corresponds to a single upstream rm
in the IO applications, while rm-level unions are the counterpart to independent
upstream rms.
The Nash solution to a bargaining problem involves the determination of payos for
each party, together with a specication of the disagreement point in case negotiations
break down (outside options). The modeling of the outside option is of course not
an issue in all those cases where the bargaining parties are assumed to be locked into
a single bilateral relationship: if a negotiation breaks down, the two parties have no
alternative and the outside option is zero (see, for instance, Correa-Lopez and Naylor,
2004; Symeonidis, 2008 and 2010; Naylor, 2002; Correa-Lopez, 2007). In the case of
input suppliers, this assumption is not very palatable: when a negotiation between
a supplier and a retailer breaks down, the former may still obtain positive prots by
selling the input to other retailers. The determination of these disagreement prots
then involves the denition of what behavior the other downstream rms have in case
of a disagreement.
The focus of this paper is on the role of the modeling choice for the behavior of
rivals' rms in case of disagreement in a Nash bargaining in vertically-related markets.
This is a general methodological problem that we specically apply to the determi-
nation of input prices. We revisit the countervailing buyer power problem posited by
Galbraith, and show that the modeling choice of the outside options changes, some-
times dramatically, the way in which the downstream market structural parameters
aect the input price and the market equilibrium.
HW themselves argue that there are at least two plausible specications for an-
alyzing the behavior of downstream rms in disagreement. In a rst scenario, the
breakdown of the negotiation between a retailer and the input supplier is observed by
the rival downstream rms; they react and make, in the downstream market, optimal
choices which take into account that there is now one less competing rm. In the se-
quel, we will label this case Reaction. Alternatively, the breakdown of the negotiation
may not be observed by the rival downstream rms. Therefore, they keep making their
optimal choices in the downstream market as if all competing rms were present. We
will label this case No Reaction, which is the specic case explicitly chosen by HW.
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In this paper, we introduce a simple model with a single upstream rm, and many
downstream rms, and revisit the question of countervailing power. Do downstream
structural parameters aect the input price? And how? We use a linear demand model
with a varying number of competing and dierentiated rms, under the dierent hy-
potheses of Reaction and No Reaction. We also conduct the analysis for both Bertrand
and Cournot downstream competition. We nd that countervailing power, interpreted
as a more concentrated downstream market, may not be able to keep input prices
low. In our framework, this actually never happens when downstream competition is
in quantities, independently of the type of reaction to disagreement. An increase in
downstream concentration may instead lower the input prices with Bertrand competi-
tion: this depends, however, on the type of reaction to breakdowns, and on the degree
of product dierentiation.
We also conduct other comparisons. We show how, under Cournot competition,
the input price is always lower with No Reaction compared to Reaction, for any degree
of product dierentiation and for any number of rms. Intuitively, if other retail rms
can observe and react to the disagreement of a rival, they will increase their quantities
when realizing they have one rival less, which, in turn, improves the value of the
supplier's outside option and generates a higher input price in equilibrium. Under
Bertrand competition, instead, the result is exactly reversed: when remaining rms
observe a disagreement, they react by pushing up their prices and this worsens the
supplier's position in its outside option compared to No Reaction, resulting in a lower
input price. Finally, under the hypothesis of Reaction, we nd that the input price is
always lower when downstream competition is in prices instead of quantities; this last
result is completely reversed in the case of No Reaction.
The issue of the modeling choice of the outside options has been somehow over-
looked by the existing literature. The motivation is possibly to ascribe to HW them-
selves which, albeit perfectly correctly, state that the two types of retailers' behavior
in case of disagreement \do not have any qualitative eects on the points [they] make"
(HW, p. 412). We will show that this statement cannot be generalized to many sim-
ple settings and that, on the contrary, the full consequences of the hypotheses used in
subsequent analyses have not been fully comprehended.
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This paper contributes directly to the understanding of countervailing buyer power,
a phenomenon originally identied by Galbraith (1952). Formalizations are more re-
cent though, starting with von Ungern-Sternberg (1996) in a Cournot model with
Reaction, and Dobson and Waterson (1997) who study Bertrand competition with
dierentiated products and with Reaction.2 The methodological implications of our
analysis ensure, however, that our paper is related to a much larger literature aimed at
studying, in the context of vertically-related industries, things such as the incentives
to merge, the eects of dierent bargaining structures, or the impact of input price
discrimination. To give just a few examples, Milliou and Petrakis (2007) study the
incentives for upstream mergers when rms can also choose the contract type (lin-
ear vs. two-part input prices) in a model in which the input price is set via a Nash
bargaining with Reaction. Marshall and Merlo (2004) and Dobson (1994) analyze pat-
tern bargaining in linear wages, both using the case of Reaction. Gal-Or and Dukes
(2006) study merger incentives in the media industry, where media stations bargain
with producers (linear) advertising rates, in a model with No Reaction. Dukes et al.
(2006) show the eects of downstream cost reductions on upstream prots when lin-
ear transfer prices are bargained, with No Reaction to disagreements. Gal-Or (1997)
studies the rationale for exclusionary contracts when health insurance companies and
hospitals bargain over the reimbursement rate (i.e., the input price), with Reaction
to negotiation breakdowns. O'Brien (forthcoming) employs a bargaining framework
to study the eects of price discrimination over the linear input sold to competing
downstream rms, and analyzes the role of outside options, though they are taken as
exogenous and unrelated to the type of competition played by the downstream rms.
All these works generalize along several dimensions the seminal contribution of HW,
often not providing sucient discussion of the role played by the modeling choice of
the outside options. Moreover, some of these contributions contrast their ndings di-
rectly with HW, despite solving, de facto, the case with Reaction, which makes some
comparisons unwarranted.3
2See also Chen (2003).
3Bilateral Nash bargaining models play an increasing role in empirical work too. Starting with
Chipty and Snyder (1999), several papers have estimated models of input pricing (programs) in the
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This paper concentrates mainly on input prices, to show the dramatic impact that
modeling reactions can have on equilibrium outcomes. As this is our main interest, we
take as given several other key assumptions: we employ the Nash axiomatic approach,
assume that agreed input contract terms are observed by all downstream rms when
competing in the retail market, and concentrate on linear input prices. These assump-
tions all correspond to the case of HW and most of the ensuing literature cited above.
They have important implications and we discuss each one in turn.
Nash axiomatic approach. As a consequence of this approach, a bargaining pair
cannot write contracts specifying dierent terms in the event of a breakdown in rivals'
negotiations: this issue is investigated by Inderst and Wey (2003) and de Fontenay
and Gans (2005), who study a sequence of bilateral negotiations.4 We employ the
so-called \split-the-dierence" rule which characterizes the asymmetric Nash bargain-
ing solution, as this gives a role to outside options. It is well-known that the unique
subgame-perfect equilibrium of a non-cooperative bargaining model with outside op-
tions and a risk of breakdown converges to the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution,
when the time period between oers and counteroers gets small. In fact, many of
the papers with bilateral negotiations draw a connection with a non-cooperative bar-
gaining, although it is fair to say that the informational assumptions to make this
connection are often dicult to map to reality.5
Observable contracts. If contracts were not observable to downstream competitors,
then commitment problems would arise as the supplier's contract terms to one rm
would not aect the downstream rivals' retail choices (McAfee and Schwartz, 1994;
cable television industry. Crawford and Yurukoglu (2009) calibrate a model with linear input prices
and Reaction to study what would happen if cable companies were to oer individual channels (a
la carte) instead of bundles. Rennho and Serfes (2008) study a similar setting, though we could
not retrieve the type of reaction they employ for disagreements. Grennan (2009) estimates a Nash
bargaining model between hospitals and medical equipment suppliers. See also Ellison and Snyder
(2010) for the case of pharmaceuticals.
4These bargainings give rise to the Shapley value. See also Bjornerstedt and Stennek (2007).
5See Appendix B for more details. The advantage of using the strategic approach is that it
explicitly delivers the disagreement points and bargaining power, and indicates how they depend on
features of the underlying game.
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Rey and Tirole, 2007).6 The supplier's opportunism problem in each bilateral contract
would turn the supplier into his worst competitor, and the input price would be set
at cost under \passive beliefs". Downstream structural parameters would essentially
play no role, and one could not address the question of countervailing power in a
meaningful way. The assumption of observability of input contracts is quite appealing
when studying the union-rm wage bargaining problem, as unions typically announce
their deals with employers as soon as they are concluded. Instead, this is less likely to
be so in the presence of hidden terms of trade between manufacturers and retailers.
Linear input prices. These are easier to justify when dealing with wage bargaining,
though they can be found in many industries. A desirable property of linear input
prices is that downstream (and, where present, upstream) conditions can aect in-
put prices.7 Linear contracting is nevertheless a restrictive assumption. We should
however note that, if observable non-linear contracts were set by a single upstream
supplier, then they would completely eliminate intrabrand competition and always
achieve the full monopoly outcome. If, instead, competing retailers make simultane-
ous take-it-or-leave-it oers to the same manufacturer, Marx and Shaer (2007) nd
that upfront payments lead to exclusive dealing provisions, with only one retailer sell-
ing in equilibrium. In both cases, the question of countervailing power would again
not be very meaningful. The case of Nash axiomatic bargaining when contracts are
observable and nonlinear is yet to be examined in full by the literature.8
The structure of the paper is as follows. We present the model in Section 2. In
6Observability here refers to contractual terms at the time of market competition, which is not to
be confused with the No Reaction case in disagreement.
7See the discussion in Inderst and Valletti (2009), where it is argued that linear prices should be
employed when preferential terms enhance a buyer's competitive position in the downstream markets,
which would not be case with two-part taris that would lead to an adjustment only in the xed part
of the tari.
8Bargaining over observable nonlinear input prices is studied, among others, by O'Brien and Shaer
(2005), Antelo and Bru (2006), Milliou and Petrakis (2007), and Symeonidis (2008 and 2010). The op-
portunism problem is reintroduced when the supplier negotiates separately with a \non-orchestrated"
number of retailers, when these bilateral negotiations result in binding contracts (i.e., they cannot be
withdrawn later after other outcomes have been observed). These results depend delicately on the fact
that contracts cannot be made contingent on market structure. See Miklos-Thal et al. (forthcoming).
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Sections 3 and 4, we derive the equilibrium input price under the two hypotheses
of Reaction and No Reaction, and for the two cases of downstream Cournot and
Bertrand. Section 5 discusses and summarizes our results. In a separate Appendix,
we generalize HW's ndings to a general number of rms, Bertrand competition, and
dierent reactions in case of disagreement.
2 The model
We consider an industry in which a single upstream supplier sells an intermediate good
to N  2 downstream rms. Downstream rms use this input to produce dierentiated
goods and sell them to nal consumers. The ratio of input to output is identical to
all downstream rms, and is normalized to one. Each downstream rm i pays a linear
input price wi to the upstream supplier and does not incur any other cost. The costs
of the single upstream supplier are normalized to zero.
We assume a linear demand structure for the nal good, where inverse demand for
the generic downstream rm i, given its own output qi and output qj of each of its
rivals, is given by
pi = 1  qi   
X
j 6=i
qj for i; j = 1; : : : ; N ; i 6= j; (1)
whenever this is positive (Singh and Vives, 1984; Hackner, 2000). This inverse demand
function is derived from the quasi-linear quadratic utility function of a representative
consumer
U =
X
i
qi   1
2
0@X
i
q2i + 2
X
j 6=i
qiqj
1A+ I; for i; j = 1; : : : ; N ; i 6= j; (2)
where I is the consumption of other goods. The parameter  describes the degree
of homogeneity between the goods produced by downstream rms. We restrict our
attention to substitute goods and therefore let  2 [0; 1]: when  = 1, downstream
goods are homogeneous, while when  = 0 we have independent goods.
Inverting (1), it is also possible to obtain the system of linear direct demand func-
tions. With N goods sold in the nal market, the demand for the generic rm i is
7
given by
qi =
(1  pi) [1 + (N   2)]  
P
j 6=i(1  pj)
(1  ) [(N   1) + 1] for i; j = 1; : : : ; N ; i 6= j; (3)
whenever this is positive.
Competition in the industry is described by a two-stage game as follows. At stage
1, the upstream rm negotiates separately with each downstream rm i the linear
input price wi. (The non-cooperative Nash equilibrium of these bargainings is further
discussed in the next section.) At stage 2, the downstream rms observe the outcomes
of stage 1 and compete against each other, either in prices or in quantities, given the
values of wi from stage 1. We derive the pure strategy equilibrium of this game.
2.1 Bargaining
The N rst-stage negotiations are conducted simultaneously so that, during bargain-
ing, the rms' negotiators treat the other input prices as given.9 Each bargaining is
obtained using the two-person Nash solution. The outcome is then a set of input prices
which represents a Nash equilibrium in the Nash bargainings.
More formally, denote by Di (wi;w i) the prot in the last stage of downstream
rm i and by U (wi;w i) the prot of the upstream rm, where wi is the input price
to rm i and w i is the (N   1)-dimensional vector of input prices to all the other
downstream rms. Let also O be the disagreement payo for the upstream rm.
Since each downstream rm i has no alternative supplier, its disagreement payo is
simply zero. At stage 1, the upstream supplier and each downstream rm i form a
separate bargaining unit and set wi to maximize the following Nash product
max
wi

i = [
U (wi;w i)  O] [Di (wi;w i)]1  for i = 1; : : : ; N; (4)
where  2 [0; 1] denotes the bargaining power of the upstream rm relative to that of
the downstream rm. The FOC of this problem can be written as

1  
Di (wi;w i)
U (wi;w i)  O =  
@Di (wi;w i)=@wi
@U (wi;w i)=@wi
for i = 1; : : : ; N: (5)
9For the upstream monopolist, this means that N separate negotiators are sent to conduct inde-
pendent negotiations with each downstream rm.
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Bargaining outcomes are observable by all, and the equilibrium of the game is found
as the Nash solution to the N separate bargaining problems. We concentrate only on
symmetric equilibria.
The disagreement payo of the upstream rm in (4) is crucial to our analysis and
is worth some further discussion. In the event of an unsuccessful negotiation between
the upstream supplier and rm i, the upstream rm can still sell to the remaining
N   1 downstream rms, and thus has an outside option equal to O = Pj 6=i wjqj ,
where qj is the quantity sold, in case of a disagreement, by each downstream rm j
dierent from i.
The breaking down of the negotiation between the upstream supplier and rm i
makes this rm unable to produce its good and sell it in the nal market. This has
two immediate consequences. In the rst place, consumers are unable to buy good i
and the system of demand functions has to, therefore, be re-adjusted. In the system of
inverse demand functions (1), the quantity demanded of good i must be set equal to
zero. The system of direct demands (3) has instead to be re-obtained by removing good
i from the consumer's choice when inverting the system of inverse demand functions.
While this re-adjustment at the consumer level is uncontroversial, the other conse-
quence of the breaking down of the negotiation for rm i depends on the way the other
downstream rivals react to the disagreement, which in turn hinges on their possibility
of observing the negotiation breakdown. We assume two possible scenarios:
 No reaction: The breakdown of the negotiation between rm i and the input
supplier is not observed by the rival downstream rms. Therefore, they are
not able to react and do not adjust their behavior to the absence of rm i in
the downstream market. On the contrary, all the rival downstream rms adopt
their optimal strategic behavior (in prices or quantities) as if all N rms were
present in the downstream market. Formally, in the case of downstream Cournot
competition, the outside option of the upstream rm is obtained by noting that
qj = bqNj (w) where bqNj (w)'s are the last-stage anticipated quantities in aN -rm
equilibrium, calculated at the anticipated equilibrium input prices, and which are
therefore independent from the currently negotiated wi. In the case of Bertrand
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competition, qj 's are the quantities bought (after the consumer's re-adjustment
of her optimally-purchased basket) when rms still play the anticipated last stage
retail prices in a N -rm equilibrium, as a function of the equilibrium input prices.
 Reaction: The breakdown of the negotiation between rm i and the input sup-
plier is observed by the rival downstream rms. They react to this by adopting
an optimal choice (in prices or quantities) which takes into account that only
N   1 rms operate in the downstream market: the upstream provider's out-
side option prots have to be calculated accordingly. Formally, in the case of
Cournot competition downstream, qj = bqN 1j (w), where bqN 1j (w)'s are the
last-stage equilibrium quantities (at negotiated input prices) when N   1 rms
compete.10 Under price competition, qj 's are the quantities bought (after the
consumer readjustment of her optimally-purchased basket) in a (N   1)-rm
Bertrand equilibrium in the nal stage of the game, as a function of the negoti-
ated input prices.
As mentioned in the Introduction, both these approaches have been used exten-
sively in the literature. The two-stage approach implies that, in both cases of Reaction
and of No Reaction, agreed input prices are observed at stage 2, when rms compete
(either in prices or in quantities). What diers, between the two cases, is only if the
possible disagreement of one downstream rm could be observed by the other rms,
therefore without changing input prices, which would involve instead some sequen-
tial game that we must avoid with a reduced two-stage approach. This is internally
consistent if disagreements are permanent.11
10In disagreement, rm i does not produce anything, and the vector of equilibrium input prices w
for the rivals does not include wi . In the literature, this case is sometimes referred to by setting wi to
innity. However, since we are always very clear on the type of reaction to disagreement, we slightly
abuse the notation by using w in both cases.
11An alternative interpretation possibly arises if disagreements were temporary. In this case, a
disagreement eectively implies that the disagreeing rm just \arrives a bit late" in the retail market,
acting there as a Stackelberg follower, while the other N   1 rms are Stackelberg leaders. This is
another instance where the dierence between price and quantity competition becomes apparent. In a
quantity-setting game, a temporary disagreement would be detrimental to the disagreeing rm, since
the other retailers would have a rst-mover advantage in making their strategic choices. But in a
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In the following sections, we characterize the equilibrium of our market game un-
der the two dierent hypotheses of Reaction/No Reaction when determining outside
options, and under two dierent modes of competition, Cournot and Bertrand. Thus
we consider four possible scenarios.
3 Cournot competition
We start the analysis with the case of downstream Cournot competition. Each retailer
sets its nal quantity to maximize Di = (pi   wi)qi, where pi is given by (1). In case
of N rms operating in the downstream industry, by solving the system of FOCs of
these problems, we obtain the second-stage subgame equilibrium quantities
bqNi (wi;w i) = (1  wi)[(N   2) + 2]  Pj 6=i(1  wj)(2  )[(N   1) + 2] ; for i; j = 1; : : : ; N ; i 6= j:
(6)
These quantities determine the agreement payos of the downstream retailers and
of the upstream supplier in the rst stage of the game, which are respectively given
by Di (wi;w i) =
bqNi (wi;w i)2 and U (wi;w i) =Pi wibqNi (wi;w i):
3.1 No reaction
In case of disagreement, retailer i cannot sell anything, thus qi = 0, but the other
retailers do not readjust their expected Nash-Cournot quantities. Hence the otherN 1
rms would still be selling qj = bqNj (w), which denotes the second stage anticipated
equilibrium quantity when the input prices are set at their equilibrium level. The
outside option for the upstream monopolist is then O =
P
j 6=i wjbqNj (w).
To solve for the equilibrium input price, we can use directly (5) and the hypothesis
of symmetry, which allows us to write wi = wj . In a symmetric equilibrium, we have
that bqNi = 1 wi2+(N 1) ; we also have simplied expressions for the rms' prots, Di = bqNi 2, U = NwibqNi and O = (N 1)wibqNi , so that we can write Ui  O = wibqNi . In
eq. (5), we can then write the LHS (ignoring the rst ratio in 's) as
bqNi
wi
= 1 wiwi[2+(N 1] ,
which is decreasing in wi; similarly the RHS could be written as
2(1 wi)[2+(N 2)]
(1 2wi)(2 )[2+(N 1)] ,
price-setting game the reverse would apply, as there would be a rst-mover advantage.
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increasing in wi. The equilibrium input price results in
wNRC =

2

1 +  (1 )(N 1)2 
 : (7)
This result is formally expressed in the following Proposition:
Proposition 1 When downstream rms compete in quantities, and there is No Re-
action to negotiations breakdowns, the input price is given by (7) and it is decreasing
both in N and in , for all  2 [0; 1]:
Therefore, in the current case with downstream Cournot competition, we do not
support the idea that higher concentration downstream exerts countervailing buyer
power and pushes down the input price. On the contrary, the input price is lower the
higher the number of downstream rms, and it goes down to zero, for any degree of
bargaining power and product dierentiation, as N !1.
3.2 Reaction
In case of Reaction, the payos of both the upstream and the downstream rms in
the event of successful bargaining are identical to the previous case. The dierence
concerns the quantities sold by the remaining rms in case the upstream monopolist is
in disagreement with rm i and its resulting payos. Clearly, also in this case, qi = 0,
but the other rms now re-adjust their quantities in the downstream market as they
anticipate that rm i produces nothing. In particular, the quantities qj they would
be selling are the second stage equilibrium quantities in an industry with only N   1
rms, that is,
bqN 1j (w) = (1  wj )[(N   3) + 2]  Pk 6=i;j(1  wj )(2  )[(N   2) + 2] : (8)
Notice that bqN 1j does not depend on wi: In a symmetric equilibrium where wi =
wj , the wholesale price is given by the following expression
wRC =

2
; (9)
12
so that we can state the following Proposition:12
Proposition 2 When downstream rms compete in quantities, and there is Reaction
to negotiations breakdowns, the input price is given by (9) and it is independent of N
and , for all values of .
In other words, this price depends only on bargaining power , while downstream
structural parameters such as the number of competing rms or the degree of product
dierentiation play no role.13
Our nding is in stark contrast with the result of von Ungern-Sternberg (1996),
derived in a setting similar to this Section, but with homogeneous goods. In his paper,
the equilibrium input price (using our notation) is w = 
2+
1 (N+1)
N
, which is increasing
in the number of downstream rms. His result is obtained using equation (5), but
setting the RHS equal to  1, as it would happen in the case of a negotiation between
the upstream rm and only one retailer. This hypothesis is, however, inconsistent
with having also assumed the existence of an outside option for the upstream rm.
This inconsistency results in a equilibrium expression of the input price which has the
strange property to be equal to 1, when all the bargaining power is with the upstream
rm ( = 1). This input price would choke-o demand completely, and no quantity
would be sold. In our model, instead, with a fully-specied game, when  = 1 the
input price is equal to 12 , i.e., the (linear) monopoly input price.
12As with Proposition 1, the equilibrium values of the input prices and the comparative statics
results in Propositions 2-5 come from a simple direct application of (5), the use of the symmetry
assumption, and elementary algebraic manipulations. Proofs are therefore omitted.
13An input price independent of the degree of product dierentiation and the number of downstream
rms is not a novelty in the literature. Milliou and Petrakis (2007) obtain the same result in a setting
with two downstream rms. Similarly, in a model of wage bargaining between unions and oligopolistic
rms, Dowrick (1989) nds that the degree of competitiveness in the retail market (expressed by a
conjectural variation parameter) does not aect the wage level. All these results extend to the case of
a bargaining over the input price, the nding that the input price set by the upstream rm as a TIOLI
oer is invariant with respect to downstream market structure when the nal demand function show
constant elasticity of slope demand (Greenhut and Ohta, 1976). For further discussion, see Section 5.
13
4 Bertrand competition
We follow the very same framework introduced above, with the only dierence that
now downstream rms compete in prices. Each retailer sets its nal price to maximize
Di = (pi   wi)qi, where qi is given by eq. (3). In case of all N rms operating in
the downstream market, after solving the system of FOCs with respect to prices, we
obtain
bpNi (wi;w i) = (1  )[2 + (2N   3)] + [1 + (N   2)]f[2 + (N   2)]wi + 
P
j 6=i
wjg
[2 + (2N   3)][2 + (N   3)] :
for i; j = 1; : : : ; N ; j 6= k. Let bpN (wi;w i) be the N -dimensional vector of such
equilibrium prices. The resulting quantities that are demanded downstream and even-
tually supplied by the upstream rm are obtained by substituting all bpi(:)'s back
into (3), so that the output of the generic rm i is given by qi(bpN (wi;w i)). The
agreement payos of the upstream supplier and downstream rm i can also be de-
termined respectively as U (wi;w i) =
P
i wiqi(bpN (wi;w i)) and Di (wi;w i) =
[bpi(wi;w i)  wi]qi(bpN (wi;w i)).
In case of disagreement between one retailer and the upstream supplier, only N 1
remaining rms operate in the nal market. Therefore, the system of demand functions
is not (3) anymore, but the one derived from the maximization of the consumer's utility
dened only over the N   1 remaining goods. Formally, this is given by
qj =
(1  pj) [(N   3)]  
P
k 6=j(1  pk)
(1  ) [(N   3) + 1] for j = 1; : : : ; N   1; j 6= k: (10)
4.1 No reaction
In disagreement, qi = 0, and the other rms do not readjust their expected Nash-
Bertrand prices of the last stage. The outside option of the upstream supplier can then
be calculated plugging into (10) the anticipated Bertrand equilibrium prices bpN (:),
calculated at the anticipated equilibrium input prices w.
The input price is obtained as the outcome of the bargaining problem as in (5),
resulting in
wNRB =

2

1   (1 )(N 1)(1+(N 1))(1+(N 2))(2+(2N 3)
 : (11)
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From (11), it follows that
Proposition 3 When downstream rms compete in prices, and there is No Reaction
to negotiations breakdowns, the input price is given by (11) and it is non-monotonic
in N and decreasing in , for all  2 [0; 1]:
In particular, we have that, for low (respectively, high) enough values of , the input
price is always increasing (respectively, decreasing) in N . When  is in a mid-range,
the input price is rst increasing and then decreasing in the number of downstream
rms. This is depicted in Panel a) of Fig. 1, where the equilibrium input price is
plotted against the number of downstream rms for dierent values of . The Figure
illustrates that the role of downstream concentration to exert countervailing buyer
power is limited to the case of downstream markets where retailers enjoy a suciently
high market power, either because products are suciently dierentiated or because
competitors are relatively few.14
a) No Reaction b) Reaction
Figure 1 - Equilibrium input price with Bertrand competition ( = 12 )
14A closer inspection of (11) reveals that @wNRB =@N > 0 when  < 2=3, for all values of N:
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4.2 Reaction
The payos of both the upstream and the downstream rms in the event of successful
bargaining are identical to the previous case. Therefore, it only remains to be discussed
what happens in disagreement. The remaining N   1 downstream rms take into
account the presence of one less competitor and choose their equilibrium prices, facing
demand as given in (10). Plugging these prices back into (10), the quantity supplied
by each downstream rm in case of disagreement can be computed.15 The equilibrium
input price is given by
wRB =

2

1 + 2 (1 )(N 1)[1+(N 1)][2+(N 3)][1+(N 2)]2[2+(2N 3)][2+(N 4)]
 : (12)
From (12), we can state
Proposition 4 When downstream rms compete in prices, and there is Reaction to
negotiations breakdowns, the input price is given by (12) and it is non-monotonic in
N and increasing in , for all  2 [0; 1].
The Proposition illustrates that, with a suciently large degree of product dier-
entiation (low values of ), there is no countervailing buyer power when N is small.
On the other hand, when products are suciently homogenous, the equilibrium in-
put price wNRB increases with N . This is also illustrated in Panel b) of Fig. 1 which
shows that downstream concentration exerts countervailing buyer power only when
downstream rms enjoy suciently low market power, either because products are
suciently homogeneous or because rms are relatively numerous.16
5 Discussion
Having obtained all the expressions for the input price under dierent modes of down-
stream competition and dierent reactions to breakdowns, in this Section we sum up
15This is essentially the case solved by Dobson and Waterson (1997), the only dierence being that
we allow for generic values of bargaining power , while they deal with the case  = 1
2
. We refer the
reader to this paper for a more detailed discussion of this case.
16A closer inspection of (12) reveals that @wRB=@N > 0 when  > 0:424, for all values of N: This
threshold value is reduced to 0:358 when taking into account that N can take only integer values.
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and discuss our ndings.
We rst provide a graphical illustration of the results, by plotting the values of the
LHS and the RHS of equation (5), whose intersection determines the equilibrium input
price. For simplicity, in this graphical treatment, we always assume equal bargaining
power of the parties (i.e.,  = 12 ). It is important to recall that the bargaining solution
has the property that a party becomes relatively stronger the higher is the value of its
outside option and the more costly are its concessions (i.e. the adverse changes in the
variable bargained upon). The LHS of (5) is the ratio between the prot levels of the
two bargaining parties, net of the value of the outside option, whenever it exists. In
all cases, this ratio is always decreasing in the equilibrium input price, w, because the
downstream (upstream, respectively) net agreement prots are decreasing (increasing,
respectively) in w. Notice that, for a given mode of downstream competition, the
LHS of (5) changes with Reaction or with No Reaction, as the supplier's prot in case
of disagreement, O, diers under the two types of reactions.
a) Cournot competition b) Bertrand competition
Figure 2 - Equilibrium condition when  varies ( = 12 and N = 3)
The RHS of (5) is the ratio of the marginal eects of a change in wi on the rms'
prots. The latter can also be seen as the ratio of concession costs. For the buyer, a
concession (an agreement to pay a higher input price) weakens its competitive position
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in the downstream market relative to rivals. For the seller, a concession is an agreement
to accept a lower price. The behavior of this ratio with respect to w is perhaps less
intuitive, though it reects the rather general property that the concession cost for a
downstream rm relative to that of the seller, is higher the higher is the general level
of input prices w (and, thus, the smaller is the equilibrium quantity produced by the
buyer). The RHS does not change with the type of reaction but only with the mode
of competition: under Cournot competition, it shifts upwards as the degree of product
dierentiation decreases, while the shift is downwards under price competition.
More in details, in Panel a) of Fig. 2, we illustrate the case of downstream quantity
competition. We keep the number of rms xed, and plot the LHS and the RHS of
(5) for the two cases of Reaction and No Reaction and for dierent values of . The
downward sloping lines are the LHS of (5) in case of Reaction and No Reaction: the
dashed lines are obtained when  = 0:8 and the solid line, identical under Reaction
and No Reaction, when  = 0. The upward sloping lines are the RHS of (5), always
identical under Reaction and No Reaction for any value of : as before, we use a
dashed line for the case of  = 0:8 and a solid line when  = 0. The intersections of
the relevant lines for the same value of  determine the equilibrium value of the input
price. More in general, we plot (in bold black) the locus of the intersections of the two
curves for all possible values of .
To understand the gure, start from the decreasing solid line: this is the LHS of (5),
both for the cases of Reaction and No Reaction when  = 0. The two are identical since
the products are now fully independent and the downstream rms always choose their
monopoly output. When we allow  to vary, the plots of the LHS of (5) change with
or without reaction to the disagreement, because of the dierent prots obtained by
the upstream rm in case of disagreement. These are higher under Reaction because,
in case of disagreement, the remaining downstream rms observe that there is one less
downstream competitor and oer a quantity larger than in the case of No Reaction.
The resulting larger aggregate quantity benets the upstream rm which makes a
higher prot, for a given level of the input price. Therefore, for each strictly positive
value of , the LHS of (5) with Reaction always lies above the corresponding line in
case of No Reaction. We plot in the same graph also the RHS of (5), which we recall
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to be identical for both cases of Reaction and No Reaction: the solid line is for  = 0
and the dotted line, lying north-west to the former, is for  = 0:8. These positions
mainly depend on the the concession cost of the downstream rm, which increases
with : under Cournot competition (and, more in general, with strategic substitutes),
an increase in the input price has a negative direct eect on prots (due to the higher
cost) and also an equally negative strategic eect, in that it worsens the competitive
position of the rm relative to its rival. This latter strategic eect is stronger the more
homogeneous the products are.
Panel a) of Fig. 2 allows us to study how the equilibrium input price varies with
. In case of No Reaction, w clearly always decreases as  increases. On the other
hand, with Reaction, any change in  induces an equal upwards shift on the LHS and
RHS of (5): the ratio of the levels and of the marginal eects is equally aected by
the dierentiation parameter and therefore w is independent with respect to .
The case of Bertrand competition is shown in Panel b). Notice again that, for
 = 0, each downstream rm is a local monopolist and the mode of downstream
competition does not aect the equilibrium: this implies that Panel b) coincides with
Panel a) so that the solid lines are the same in the two panels. The two panels, however,
show two remarkable dierences. In the rst place, the LHS of (5) with No Reaction
always lies above the corresponding line in case of Reaction for each strictly positive
. This is because the supplier's prots in case of disagreement are always lower under
Reaction. In this case, the remaining downstream rms observe that there is one
less downstream competitor and set a price higher than in the case of No Reaction.
Even after the consumers' readjustment, these higher prices result in lower aggregate
quantity, which therefore reduces the value of the upstream rm's outside option, for
a given level of input prices. The second dierence is that now the RHS of (5) when
 is positive lies south-east to the same line when  = 0. As in the case of Cournot
competition, this is again mostly driven by the concessions costs for the downstream
rm, i.e., the numerator of the RHS of (5). However, contrary to Cournot, the negative
direct eect on prots of an increase of w is now compensated by a positive strategic
eect due to the softening of competition as rms compete in strategic complements.
Overall, this Panel shows clearly that, in the case of Reaction, w decreases with ,
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while the opposite behavior occurs in the case of No Reaction.17
We now turn to a more formal pair-wise comparison of the levels of the equilibrium
input prices. We compare them in two ways: for a given mode of competition, between
the two types of reaction to breakdowns; and for a given type of reaction, across
the dierent modes of downstream competition. This is illustrated in the following
Proposition.
Proposition 5 For all strictly positive values of  and , and for all values of N  2,
we have that
 wNRC < wRC and wRB < wNRB ;
 wRB < wRC and wNRC < wNRB .
It is possible to give an interpretation of the rst line of inequalities in Proposition
5 by looking at Fig. 2. As already discussed above, with quantity competition (Panel
a)), the LHS with Reaction always lies above its counterpart in case of No Reaction,
while the RHS is the same. Clearly, this motivates the ranking of the equilibrium input
prices, with and without reaction. A similar argument justies the opposite results for
the case of price competition (Panel b)).
A similar argument explains also the second line of inequalities in Proposition 5.
First, we re-emphasize that both supplier's and retailer's prots are identical under
quantity and price competition when  = 0. Therefore, the solid lines when  = 0
are identical in both Panels, and the equilibrium input prices are identical under
Bertrand and Cournot competition: wj=0  wmon = 0:25. As clearly shown in Fig.
2 by the bold lines, in case of No Reaction, w decreases below wmon as  increases
under Cournot competition (Panel a)), while the opposite holds in the case of Bertrand
competition (Panel b)). An equal but opposite argument holds for the case of Reaction,
17The picture obtained by xing  and letting N vary is not provided here to save on space. In
this case, the behavior of the RHS of (5) with respect to N is non-monotonic. On the one hand, this
non-monotonic behaviour explains the non-monotonicity of the equilibrium input price with respecto
to N described in Propositions 3 and 4. On the other hand, it generates a gure which is quite hard
to read.
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with the only dierence that under Cournot the input price is always equal to wmon,
while under Bertrand competition w < wmon:
Although we concentrated our analysis on input prices, we can also derive the
following welfare result almost immediately:
Proposition 6 Let W tm be the equilibrium welfare value when m = B;C is the mode
of competition and t = R;NR is the type of reaction to disagreement. For all strictly
positive values of  and , and for all values of N  2, we have that
 WRC < WNRC and WNRB < WRB ;
 WRC < WRB and WNRB < WNRC .
Identical results hold for consumer surplus.
Proof. In a symmetric equilibrium when q denotes the equilibrium quantity sold by
each downstream rm in the nal market and p its equilibrium price, using (1) and
(2) we can write consumer surplus and total welfare as
CS(q) = U(q) Npq = N(q
)2
2
(1 + (N   1));
W (q) = U(q) Npq +N(p   w)q +Nwq
= N [q   (q
)2
2
(1 + (N   1))]:
Since CS(q) and W (q) are both increasing in q in the relevant range, and q is
decreasing in w, our claim follows directly from Proposition 5.
Proposition 6 is the immediate counterpart of Proposition 5. It shows that the
ranking between the dierent cases analyzed, presented in Proposition 5 as a function
of input prices, can be applied, when completely reversed, to the case of the welfare
ranking. Proposition 6 does not provide additional comparative statics exercises on
CS and W , which could be carried out with respect to the structural parameters
N and  in the various cases. Though feasible, we chose not to do so in order to
keep the paper short. We notice that these additional comparative statics are not
necessarily equivalent to those on w, as the structural parameters also enter directly
the expressions for W and CS.
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6 Conclusions
This paper has shown that the original idea of Galbraith (1952) that countervailing
power could keep input prices low is not a general result. In our framework, this can
happen only with Bertrand competition, and only if the degree of product dierenti-
ation falls in some interval. Even in this case, the relevant interval is aected by the
type of reaction expected in case of a negotiation breakdown.
Our main interest in this paper was to show how the role of modelling reactions to
disagreements is sometimes not fully appreciated by the applied IO/Labor literature,
despite having quite crucial implications on outcomes. We believe that there is not
a superior or more realistic modeling disagreement choice: it will depend on circum-
stances. For instance, in the example of grocery stores and retailing, if negotiations
fail, this will probably not be observed immediately by competing products (while cus-
tomers will not nd the product available on the shelves). In this case, rival products
will not re-adjust their strategic choices under disagreement. In other circumstances,
rivals would be able to react. A notable example could the bargaining of landing fees
between airports and airline carriers: in disagreement, a ight will not be available,
and since this is likely to be visible (because of the change in timetable over the inter-
net where bookings can be made), rival airlines will realize they face less competition
and react accordingly.
In this paper we chose countervailing power and the impact on input prices, though
several further questions could be re-assessed using our methodological approach. We
are not, however, saying that one should not expect robust results to arise, simply
by changing the mode of competition or the type of reaction. The answer depends of
course on the particular question asked. In the Appendix, we revisit HW and show
that their central result is indeed very robust, as it arises independently from the type
of reaction or from the mode of competition.
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Appendix A
In this Appendix we revisit HW's main result, namely that an upstream merger always
increases the input price to downstream rms. HW analyze the case of two downstream
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Cournot rms and two upstream rms that may merge. Without an upstream merger, each
upstream rm can supply only one specic downstream rm; with an upstream merger, the
outside option of the upstream rm in disagreement is modeled as with No Reaction.
We generalize HW's ndings to a general number of rms, Bertrand competition, and
dierent reactions in case of disagreement. In the absence of an upstream merger, we maintain
HW's hypothesis that each downstream rm deals with an independent upstream rm. Thus
we modify our analysis to allow for the existence of N independent upstream rms. For both
types of downstream competition, we rst characterize the equilibrium input prices in the
case of N independent suppliers.18 We then compare it with the ones obtained in the case
of an upstream merger: when there is a single upstream supplier, the analysis corresponds to
the one we have conducted in Sections 3 and 4.19
Let us start with downstream Cournot competition. The second stage is the same as the
one described in Section 3. In the rst stage, each rm is in a bilateral monopoly relation
with an independent supplier, and the Nash bargain problem with zero outside options gives
wIC =

2 + (2 )(N 1)
2 
; (13)
where the superscript I is a mnemonic for `independent' upstream rms. This input price
clearly simplies to HW's solution wI = 2 
8  for  =
1
2
(see eq. (6) in HW). Comparing this
with the input price obtained with a single merged upstream rm, respectively for the case
of Reaction (7) and No Reaction (9), it is established immediately that
wIC < w
NR
C and w
I
C < w
R
C :
We turn now to the case of downstream Bertrand competition, where the second stage is the
same as the one studied in Section 4. In the rst stage, with N independent upstream rms,
the Nash bargain problem with zero outside options gives
wIB =

2 + (2 )(N 1)(1+N 2)
(1 )(2(1+N)+3)
: (14)
Comparing this with the input price obtained with a single merged upstream rm, respectively
for the case of Reaction (7) and No Reaction (9), simple algebra allows us to nd that
wIB < w
NR
B and w
I
B < w
R
B :
Thus we have conrmed the robustness of the results of HW obtained for the special case of
N = 2 and  = 1
2
. This is formally stated in the following proposition:
18As a downstream rm and its upstream supplier are locked into bilateral relations when they
bargain, their outside options are zero, and in this case we should not worry about the type of
reaction to disagreements.
19As in HW, we consider an upstream merger to monopoly. While this may be rarely observed
in practice, it can be a more realistic assumption in international mergers when upstream suppliers
belong to geographically dierent markets, or when describing a union-rm wage bargaining problem.
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Proposition 7 For any value of N  2,  2 [0; 1], and  2 [0; 1], an upstream merger
to monopoly always increases the input price, independently from the type of downstream
competition (quantity vs price) and from downstream reactions in case of a disagreement
during bargaining (Reaction vs No Reaction).
Appendix B
In this Appendix we replicate the relationship between the Nash axiomatic approach we have
employed, and a strategic representation of a bargaining game. Imagine two players are trying
to divide a pie of size 1. Let w be the share going to agent 1, and 1   w the share going to
player 2. The player who makes the oer is determined randomly each period, and let it be
agent i with probability pi > 0, and p1 + p2 = 1. The payos from an agreement at date t
are given by tii(w), where the functions i(w) are well behaved. The length of a period is a
variable, given by , so that t = 0;; 2; :::, and the discount factor is written as i =
1
1+ri
,
where ri is the discount rate of player i. We allow for the possibility of exogenous breakdowns
in the negotiations. Let i be the Poisson arrival rate with which i believes an exogenous
breakdown will occur; i.e., i is the probability a breakdown will occur in a small interval
of time of length . When a breakdown occurs, the game ends, and let bi be the utility of
player i in this event. The reservation values satisfy the following recursive relations:
1(w1) =
1
1 + r1
[1b1 + (1  1)(p11(w2) + p21(w1))] ; (15)
2(w2) =
1
1 + r2
[2b2 + (1  2)(p12(w2) + p22(w1))] ; (16)
such that in any subgame, player 1 accepts any oer w  w1 and player 2 accepts any
oer w  w2, and each player always proposes the reservation value of the other agent.
For example, the rst equation says that agent 1 is indierent between accepting w1 and
rejecting it for a chance at a counteroer after waiting , which also brings the possibility of
a breakdown.
Let w = p1w1 + p2w2 be the average oer, which is arbitrarily close to both w1 and w2
for small . Consider a rst-order Taylor's approximation of (15) and (16) around w:
1(w) + (w1   w)01(w) = 1
1 + r1
[1b1 + (1  1)1(w)] + o(); (17)
2(w) + (w2   w)02(w) = 1
1 + r2
[2b2 + (1  2)2(w)] + o(); (18)
where o() is a function with the property that o()= ! 0 as  ! 0. If we multiply
(17) and (18) respectively by (1 + r1) (1 + r2)p2
0
2 and (1 + r1) (1 + r2)p1
0
1, add the
equations and simplify, we arrive at
(1+r1)p1[2(w)(r2+2) 2b2]01(q)+(1+r2)p2[1(w)(r1+1) 1b1]02(w) = o()=:
26
As ! 0, this tends to
p1
r1+1
p2
r2+2
2(w)  2b2r2+2
1(w)  1b1r1+1
=  
0
2(w)
01(w)
:
To conclude, w solves a generalized Nash problem like (5) in the main text, where the
outside options are given by Oi =
ibi
ri+i
and the bargaining power of agent 1 is given by
 = p1(r2+2)
p1(r2+2)+p2(r1+1)
. One interpretation is that Oi is the utility that player i can get by
delaying the agreement forever, appropriately discounted. As ri ! 0 expressions simplify to
Oi = bi and  =
p12
p12+p21
and the disagreement points are the exogenous payos in the
event of a breakdown (this is the case discussed in Binmore et al., 1986).
27
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